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DEVELOPMENTS
The Refugee Act of 1980
Although the grand purposes of the Refugee Act of 19801 were to give
statutory meaning to our "history of welcoming homeless refugees to our
shores" and to signify our "national commitment to human rights and
humanitarian concerns,' '1 the American public's reaction to this past
summer's dramatic influx of Cuban refugees coupled with the Carter Ad-
ministration's decision to use traditional executive parole powers to admit
Cuban and Haitian refugees4 promise to compromise the Act's utility.
The Refugee Act, which became law in March of 1980,5 was intended
to provide a "permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to
this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern."6 Prior to this
enactment, immigration legislation contained no explicit procedures for
the general admission of economic or political refugees. To the contrary,
previous legislation was expedient in nature and reflected America's geo-
1. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(1976)).
2. See S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 515.
3. Some immigration lawyers forecast that the resettlement difficulties of the Cuban
refugees, such as the riots of 1 June 1980 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, will prompt Congress to
reevaluate U.S. refugee policy. See Slonim, Freedom Flotilla from Cuba: Will the Harbor
Stay Open?, 66 A.B.A.J. 823, 825 (1980). Although local resentment of those in Arkansas,
Idaho, and other resettlement states primarily may be related to a fear of economic compe-
tition and the sentiment that "charity begins at home," racial opposition to the admission of
Latin and Vietnamese refugees has been noted. Doris Meissner, Deputy Associate Attorney
General, has expressed concern that the Cuban/Haitian refugee dilemma will reinforce nega-
tive racial attitudes toward U.S. immigration policy in the future: "I'm quite worried about
a heavy-handed approach because of the political atmosphere. It think the long-range im-
pact is going to be to add to the already strong fear that most Americans have about lots of
new people of other colors being in the United States." Id. at 824.
4. On 19 June 1980, the administration announced that the 114,000 Cubans who ar-
rived between 21 April and 19 June and those Haitians who arrived before 19 June would be
classified as Cuban/Haitian Entrants (Status Pending). This allows them six months admis-
sion on a parole basis under the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 212(d)(5)
(1976). This admission route, however, is only a stopgap measure which requires that special
legislation be passed to normalize the status of these immigrants. Senator Kennedy, chief
architect of the 1980 Refugee Act, has argued that the administration's reluctance to use the
admission procedures of the Act will compromise its future. See Slonim, Cuban Refugee
Crisis: Quick Test for New Law, 66 A.B.A.J. 826 (1980).
5. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(b), 94 Stat. 102.
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political position rather than our humanitarian concerns. For example,
prior to 1965, all refugees were admitted under such special legislation as
the 1948 Displaced Persons Act (for a limited number of "eligible dis-
placed persons"), 7 the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (for three classes of
displaced Eastern Europeans),$ or the 1960 Fair Share Act (for "refugee-
escapees").' In 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act was revised so
that, to be admitted, a refugee had to prove that he departed from a com-
munist or communist-dominated country or that he came from a country
in "the general area of the Middle East."' Because these sharp geograph-
ical and ideological limitations allowed limited political flexibility, the
majority of refugees during these years were admitted through the Attor-
ney General's special parole authority, i.e., special admission "for emer-
gent reasons or for reasons deemed in the public interest."'"
The use of parole authority as the mainstay of the United States ref-
ugee policy, however, has been criticized as being ad hoc, discriminatory,
and inefficient.'2 As was demonstrated by the case of Uganda in 1972, the
requirements of U.S. immigration law often stymie executive desire for
7. Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 411 (1953)(expired in 1956).-The act permitted the spe-
cial admission of 205,000 displaced persons. Id. § 20.
8. Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504, amended by Migration and Refugee Assistance Act
of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, § 6, 76 Stat. 124 (1962), repealed by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-326, § 16, 79 Stat. 919.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976).
10. Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 913 (1965).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Over one million refugees have been admitted under the
Attorney General's parole authority
HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF REFUGEE PAROLE ACTION
Year Country and Class of people Total
1956 ............ Orphans from Eastern European countries ......... 925
1957-57 .......... Refugees from Hungary .......................... 38,045
1960-65 .......... Refugees-escapees from Eastern European countries 19,754
1962 ............ Chinese refugees from Hong Kong and Macao ...... 14,741
1962-79 .......... Refugees from Cuba ............................. 692,219
1973-79 .......... Refugees from the Soviet Union ................... 35,758
1975-79 .......... Indochinese refugees ............................. 208,200
1975-77 .......... Chilean detainees ................................ 1,310
1975-77 .......... Chilean refugees from Peru ....................... 112
1976-77 .......... Latin American refugees (Chileans, Bolivians, and
U ruguayans) .................................... 343
1978-79 .......... Lebanese refugees ............................... 1,000 (est.)
1979 ........... Cuban prisoners and families ..................... 15,000 (est.)
Total: 1,027,407
S. Rop. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1979). For an excellent survey of the role of parole
authority under previous immigration legislation, see Evans, The Political Refugee in
United States Immigration Law and Practice, 3 INT'L LAW. 204 (1968).
12. See, e.g., Mackler, Fleeing Political Refugee's Final Hurdle-The Immigration and
Nationality Act, 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 9 (1978); Note, Immigration Law and the Refugees-A
Recommendation to Harmonize the Statutes with the Treaties, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 129
(1975); Note, Refugees Under United States Immigration Law, 24 CLEV. ST. L. Rv. 528
(1975).
DEVELOPMENTS
expeditious parole admission. Because Uganda was neither communist
nor in the Middle East, the 1,550 Orientals who were expelled upon Gen-
eral Amin's threat of extermination were admitted only after great proce-
dural difficulties and, upon entry, they enjoyed fewer resettlement privi-
leges than they would have had they been refugees from such "preferred"
countries as the Soviet Union of Lebanon."'
In an attempt to redirect this muddled policy, the Refugee Act seeks
to accomplish five objectives. First, it repeals the current immigration
law's discriminatory treatment of refugees by providing a new definition
of refugees, drawn from the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees,14 that recognizes the plight of homeless people all over the world
regardless of their national, regional, or political origin. This definition is
significant because it recognizes the obligations of the United States
under the 1967 Protocol. Prior to the new act, the government's attitude
had been that accession to the Protocol did not enlarge our immigration
responsibilities toward refugees.18 Second, the Act raises the annual limi-
tation for admission of regular refugees ("normal-flow refugees") from
17,400 to 50,000." Third, it provides an orderly procedure for meeting
emergency refugee situations if the needs of displaced people cannot be
met within the regular 50,000-person limit.' It is hoped that these last
two revisions will add needed flexibility to the Immigration and National-
ity Act and reduce the need for ad hoc parole admission. Fourth, to en-
sure congressional control over the admission and resettlement process,
the Act requires that Congress be consulted before refugees are admit-
ted.18 Lastly, the Act provides for federal support for the resettlement of
refugees - including cash and medical benefits for up to a two-year period
following admission.1 9
The Refugee Act was designed to provide maximum flexibility to
cope with both political asylum and "emergency refugee situations,"
which have been considered by the legislative committees as "an unfore-
seen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for im-
mediate action."' 0 The unexpected arrival of more than 114,000 Cuban
refugees during the three months following the bill's enactment severely
tested the utility of the new law. Although the Act outlines admission
13. For a general discussion of the treatment of expellees under international law, see 2
A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 244 (1972).
14. Done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. The Protocol entered into
force with respect to the United States on 1 November 1968.
15. See Letter of Transmittal From President Johnson to the Senate (Aug. 1, 1968), S.
EXEC. K., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1968). See also Note, Political Asylum in the United
States: A Failure of Human Rights Policy, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 133, 147-49 (1977).
16. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207(a)(1), 94 Stat. 103.
17. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207(b), 94 Stat. 103.
18. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(f), 94 Stat. 104.
19. Pub. L. No. 96-212, Titles III-IV, 94 Stat. 109-18.
20. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 524.
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procedures for refugees who are either of "special concern" or who seek
admission because of a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion"' (which is a definition certainly broad enough to include
the Cuban and Haitian refugees), President Carter chose to bypass these
asylum provisions on the assumption that "[olur laws never contemplated
and do not adequately provide for people coming directly to our shores
the way the Cubans and the Haitians have done recently. '22 The adminis-
tration instead chose to admit the refugees on a six-month parole basis
which will require special legislation to be passed in the future to normal-
ize the status of those immigrants."
Although it is understandable that the administration would wish to
delay use of the Refugee Act in an election year, especially considering its
potential expense and probable conflict with current immigration senti-
ment, President Carter's interpretation of the Act runs contrary to the
intention of the drafters. The Senate Judiciary Committee defines an
emergency refugee situation in terms of a sudden exodus of people from a
country where there had been no refugee flow before, a substantial in-
crease in the number of people from an area where normal-flow refugees
were never expected, or a flow of refugees resulting from any catastrophic
circumstance." Despite having flexible legislation tailored for such emer-
gency situations, the Carter Administration refused to use the new law
and has thus, in the eyes of its drafters, imperiled its usefulness for the
coming years.
President Carter's indecisiveness is not the only factor endangering
the bill, however. The hardening political atmosphere within the United
States toward illegal immigration from Mexico and elsewhere promises to
spawn a legislative movement to reevaluate our asylum policy. Senator
Kennedy's euphoric rhetoric of 1977 that it is our "national commitment
to welcome homeless refugees to our shores"' 5 may not be shared in the
1980's by many of his fellow senators such as Arkansas Democrats Dale
Bumpers and David Pryor who have had to cope with strong local resent-
ment toward refugees in the wake of the riots at Fort Chaffee.26 More-
over, the Presidential-Congressional Select Commission on Immigration
and Refugee Policy, which will issue its report in March of 1981, has pre-
liminarily indicated that it will propose various programs to inhibit the
flow of immigrants-including stricter border enforcement, sanctions
against those hiring illegal aliens, and an employee identification card to
21. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 202(a), 94 Stat. 102.
22. Statement of President Carter, May 14, 1980, quoted in Slonim, supra note 4, at
826.
23. Id.
24. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 524.
25. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Npws 515.
26. Slonim, supra note 3, at 824.
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be carried by all Americans. 1 Given this changing political situation and
the Carter Administration's refusal to utilize the flexibility offered by the
Refugee Act, it is probable that the new law is already antiquated and an
inaccurate statement of our refugee policy.
Peter T. Moore
27. Id. In 1980 alone, an estimated two million people migrated to the United States.
Although 800,000 of this number came legally as immigrants and refugees, at least 1,200,000
violated U.S. laws to enter. No country has ever absorbed as many new residents in one year
during peacetime. Accordingly, it is understandable that many Americans feel threatened
under a seeming barrage of legal and illegal immigration. The report of the Select Commis-
sion on Immigration and Refugee Policy is expected to reflect this hardened attitude. See
Goldenberg, Bursting through the Golden Door, Rocky Mtn. News, Jan. 19, 1981, at 43, col.
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